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Do you trust that “the price is right”?
 Holistic system (social) view is passé
 Tenants make resource acquisition/control 
decisions; no incentive to optimize for, or be 
fair/friendly to others – it’s a marketplace
 Infrastructure owners have no incentive to 
minimize cost for tenants; they only react to 
marketplace pressure
 Economic utility as a dimension of trust
 Challenge is to design the mechanisms that 
engender trust in the cloud marketplace
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Current IaaS Practice: Fixed Pricing
“Pricing is per instance-hour 
consumed for each instance type. 
Partial instance-hours consumed 
are billed as full hours.”
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Marketplace Implications?
08:00 am / Amazon  $3 09:00 am / Amazon  $3
10:00 am / Amazon  $2 11:00 am / Amazon  $2
Hosts
Tasks
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(Cloud) Colocation Games
 IaaS cloud providers offer fixed-sized 
instances for a fixed price
 Provider’s profit = number of instances 
sold; no incentive to colocate customers
 Virtualization enables colocation to 
reduce costs without QoS compromises
 Customers’ selfishness reduces the 
colocation process to a strategic game
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Colocation Games: Questions
 Does it reach equilibrium?
 If so, how fast? 
 If so, at what price (of anarchy)?
 How about multi-resource jobs/hosts?
 How about multi-job tasks?
 How about job/host dependencies?
 How could it be implemented?
 How would it perform in practice?
 …
December 9, 2011 In Cloud (Markets) We Trust by A. Bestavros @ DIMACS 7
Colocation Game: Model 
 A hosting graph G =(V,E) 
 V & E labeled by capacity vector R and fixed price P
 Workloads as task graphs Ti =(Vi,Ei) 
 Vi & Ei labeled by a utilization vector W
 Valid mappings
 Vi  V & Ei  E: Σ W ≤ R ; supply meets demand
 Shapley Cost function
 Cost P of a resource is split among workloads 
mapped to it in proportion to use
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The General Colocation Game (GCG)
 GCG is a pure strategies game: 
Each workload is able to make a (better 
response) “move” from a valid mapping M into 
another M′ so as to minimize its own cost
 Example applications:
 Overlay reservation, e.g., on PlanetLab
 CDN colocation, e.g., on CloudFront
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General Colocation Game: Properties 
 GCG may not converge to 
a Nash equilibrium
 Theorem: 
Determining whether a GCG has a 
Nash Equilibrium is NP-Complete 
(by reduction to 3-SAT problem)
 Need more structure to 
ensure convergence
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Colocation Games: Variants
 Process Colocation Game (PCG):
Each workload consists of a single vertex 
representing an independent process that needs to 
be assigned to a single host with only one 
capacitated resource
 Multidimensional PCG (MPCG):
Same as PCG but with multi capacitated resources
 Example applications:
 VM colocation, e.g., on a Eucalyptus cluster
 Streaming server colocation
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Colocation Games: Variants
 Parallel PCG (PPCG):
Task graph consists of a set of disconnected 
vertices (independent processes), each with 
multidimensional resource utilization needs
 Uniform PPCG:
Same as PPCG but with identical resource 
utilization for all processes
 Example applications:
 Map-Reduce paradigm
 MPI scientific computing paradigm
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Colocation Games: Theoretical results
 PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium under 
better-response dynamics
 PCG converges to a Nash Equilibrium in O(n2)
better-response moves, where n = |V| 
 Price of Anarchy for PCG is 3/2 when hosting 
graph is homogeneous and 2 otherwise
 MPCG converges to a Nash equilibrium under 
better-response dynamics
 Uniform PPCG converges to a Nash equilibrium 
under better-response dynamics
 …
4CLOUDCOMMONS: Architecture
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CLOUDCOMMONS: Benefit to Customers
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Planet-Lab trace-driven experiments
(Overheads/costs of all XCS services included)
50% of 
customers 
save more 
than 68%
At most 7% 
of customers 
overpay less 
than 1%
Can we think of a better mechanism?
 Customer cost should be a function of 
supply and demand
 Supply may vary over time
 Supplier’s cost may vary over time
 Demand may vary over time
 Demand may exhibit structure, and may be 
subject to malleable constraints
 Need language to specify supply and 
demand (and act as basis for SLAs) 
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Resource Supply/Demand Model
 Supply/demand SLA types: ሺܥ, ܶ, ܦ,ܹሻ
 ܥ ~ amount available or consumed
 ܶ ~ allocation period
 ܦ ~ tolerable number of missed allocations in ܹ
 ܹ ~ window of >= 1 allocation intervals 
 Examples
 SLA type ሺ2,5,0,1ሻ
2 resource units supplied/consumed every 5 seconds 
with no missed allocations allowed
 SLA type ሺ3,30,2,5ሻ
3 resource units supplied/consumed every 30 seconds 
with no more than 2 out of 5 missed allocations
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5SLA Calculus
 Models various patterns of allocation and 
consumption (e.g., RR, GPS, LB, …)
 SLA types define type hierarchies
 ሺ1, ܰ, 0,1ሻ 	൏ 	 ሺ݇, ݇ ∗ ܰ, 1,0ሻ
 ሺܥ, ܶ, ܦ,ܹሻ 	൏ 	 ሺܥ, ܶ, ܦ’,ܹሻ, if	ܦ ൏ ܦ’
 …
 Possible to transform SLAs from one 
form to another (safer) form
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Using SLA Calculus for Colocation 
 Not possible 
to colocate
 Possible to 
colocate
 SLA types and calculus provide a notion of 
supply & demand elasticity  
Job 1 Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5
C 1 2 3 4 5
T 4 9 17 34 67
Job 1 Job 2 Job 3 Job 4 Job 5
C 1 2 3 4 5
T 4 8 16 32 64
Morphing SLAs for Efficiency
MorphoSys
Demand
Types
{R}
Supply
Types
{S}
{S’}  {R’}
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MorphoSys: Performance  
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Morph Once @ Arrival
Morph Co-Tenants
Allow Relocation
6Beyond Simple Types
 A workload is a set of requests (tasks), 
each with its SLA, subject to constraints:
 Temporal dependencies between tasks
 Start and end times
 Flexibilities might exist; another source 
of elasticity:
 Min and max delays between tasks
 Deadline slacks
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Workload = DAG of SLA types
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The Customer’s Perspective
 Why should customers expose the 
elasticity of their workloads?
 Current IaaS (fixed) pricing mechanisms 
do not provide proper incentives
 Implications:
 Less efficient workload management
 Customers (should) game the marketplace  
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Dynamic Pricing: Shapley Value
 Well defined concept for fair cost sharing 
from coalitional game theory
 Marginal contribution to the total cost, averaged 
over every permutation, e.g., for 3 workloads
ݏ ݓଵ ൌ
1
6
2 ܿ wଵ ൅ ܿ wଶwଵ െ ܿሺwଶሻ ൅ ܿ wଷwଵ െ ܿሺwଷሻ ൅
ܿ wଶwଷwଵ െ ܿሺwଶwଷሻ ൅ ܿ wଷwଶwଵ െ ܿሺwଷwଶሻ
 Impractical to calculate
 Estimate by sampling random permutations
December 9, 2011 In Cloud (Markets) We Trust by A. Bestavros @ DIMACS 24
7Workload Elasticity = Savings
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Utopian
Fixed
Workload Type
Workload Elasticity = Savings
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Variability in Energy Cost
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Conclusion
 Resource management must be seen in an 
economics context
 By setting up the right mechanisms, one 
can engender trust in the cloud marketplace
 Supply elasticity meets demand elasticity 
for an efficient marketplace 
 New services needed to support strategic 
and operational aspects of new mechanisms 
CLOUDCOMMONS: http://csr.bu.edu/cc
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